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Abstract—We use our numerical technique to explore the
optimality of risk-taking under ﬁnancial distress. In our model,
cash reserves are represented by a Brownian processes that
includes an innovation parameter. When this innovation pa-
rameter goes to zero, our results show that risk-taking is
optimal only when distress costs are extremely high. Thus,
non-innovators need a hefty penalty to optimally take risks
under ﬁnancial distress. As the level of innovation increases
however, it becomes optimal for innovators to undertake risky
investments under ﬁnancial distress without hefty penalties. The
implications of our analysis might partially explain the ﬁnancial
crisis of 2007-2009.
Index Terms—stochastic control, numerical methods, Brow-
nian motion, ﬁnancial distress, risk.
I. INTRODUCTION
[1] says that, because of the costs associated with ﬁnancial
distress, managers will “attempt to reduce the variability
of operating cash ﬂows by favoring less risky investment
projects” in order to hold on to their jobs. [2] substantiate
this statement. They show that when cash reserves are low,
it is optimal to choose less risky investments, and as cash
reserves increase it is optimal to undertake investments
of increasing risk. The reality however, is that when cash
reserves are low, managers will undertake risky investments.
One story involves the FedEx CEO, Fred Smith who –
worried about making payments for day-to-day operations –
took some money from the ﬁrms coffers to a casino inLas
Vegas.
Clearly this sort of behavior is suboptimal to the ﬁrm.
By needlessly exposing it to unnecessary risks, the manager
is endangering the future of the company. We ask the
question though, is it ever optimal to take risks when under
ﬁnancial distress? And, further, what conditions allow for
this optimality?
With the objective of maximizing dividends, we ﬁnd
that it is indeed optimal for the manager to choose a risky
investment when ﬁnancial distress costs are considerably
high for a non-innovative ﬁrm1. As the level of innovation
increases, we ﬁnd that the distress costs need not be
prohibitively high for optimal risk-taking under ﬁnancial
distress. The uniqueness of an innovative ﬁrms products
allows it to undertake greater risks to exit distress, whereas
a non-innovative ﬁrm will only be forced to take risks when
punished heftily under distress.
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1About 20% to 60% of the risk-free rate.
In our framework, we extend [2] and [3] to create a model
of the ﬁrm that includes ﬁnancial distress, that also accounts
for its level of innovation and we solve it using our numerical
technique. This also enables us to allow for the ﬁrm to invest
in more than one investment project, which is not possible in
[3] where the authors create the following mixed arithmetic-
geometric Brownian motion process:
dXt = X (idt + idWt)   dZt;where 0 <  < 1 (1)
Here, dXt is the instantaneous increment of the cash
reserve coming in at time t, i is the expected rate of increase
of the reserves, and i is the contribution to net revenue
of Wt, a standard Brownian motion or Wiener process, and
i = 1;:::;n. When  = 0 or  = 1, the process becomes
arithmetic or geometric Brownian motion, respectively2.
The authors in [3] call  the capital productivity parameter.
We however, interpret  as an innovation parameter. The
greater the value of , the greater the level of innovation
to the ﬁrm. Ceteris paribus, a larger  means a more
innovative ﬁrm, and because this ﬁrm produces a unique
product, this will result in a larger incremental change on Xt.
In our model, we include an exogenous ﬁnancial distress
threshold below which the manager incurs a penalty in the
form of reduced drift. These penalties are representative
of any number of costs associated with ﬁnancial distress,
including extra interest charged on loans, the unavailability
of commercial paper, a reduction of the accounts receivable
period or simply business lost because of a reduced reputa-
tion. [4] has deﬁned them as coming from three sources:
1) The loss of customers, suppliers and employees.
2) Financial penalties imposed by missing debt payments.
3) The costs of foregoing positive NPV projects due to
the increased costs of external ﬁnancing.
Our objective is to maximize expected, discounted divi-
dends over all time; our objective function is given by:
V (x) = sup
(i;t;i;t);Zt
Ex
Z 1
0
e rtdZt;where x = X0 (2)
We include ﬁnancial distress costs into the mixed
arithmetic-geometric Brownian process, that includes
the innovation parameter, . The ﬁrm experiences the
same level of risk, i), but experiences ﬁnancial distress
costs in terms of a lowered return, i.e., 0
i < i;i = 1;:::;1.
dXt =

X (0
idt + idWt   dZt) if 0  Xt  
X (idt + idWt   dZt) if Xt > 
(3)
All the terms here have the same meaning as equation (1);
 is the exogenously given ﬁnancial distress threshold, and
2For  = 0, the model becomes the Radner-Shepp model.
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i is the reduced return (0
i < i;for Xt  ). The return is
lowered as a cost to the ﬁrm for allowing its reserves to go
below the distress threshold. Also, the innovation parameter,
0   < 1. Note that when  = 0, the process becomes an
arithmetic Brownian motion.
In this framework, the manager must choose from a set
of available (i;i) pairs, in order to maximize dividends,
dZt. The manager must decide the optimal dividend policy,
and control ﬁrm value using the portfolios available. The
optimal solution involves the manager giving out dividends
incrementally and instantaneously whenever the cash reserve
goes above an implicit threshold3, a. Furthermore, it is
optimal to switch between successively higher volatility/drift
ratios as the reserve increases to a.
II. METHODOLOGY
Our methodology involves using Itˆ o’s Lemma,
discretization of the continuous-time problem and
minimization using linear programming.
We ﬁrst create a process Y (t) deﬁned as follows:
Yt = V (Xt)e rt +
Z t
0
e rsdZs (4)
Yt can be viewed as a total revenue process at some time,
t  0, which consists of our guess (V (Xt)) as to what
the proﬁt-maximizing dividends will be into the future,
discounted back to time, t; and the sum (i.e., integral) of all
dividends earned from time 0 up to that same time, t.
Our methodology is based on the following lemma from
[2]:
Lemma 1. If the process Yt is a supermartingale, then a
guess, V (Xt), to the actual solution, V (x), of the problem
supEx
R 1
0 e rtdZt will be greater than or equal to the
actual solution.
Proof: If Yt is a supermartingale (an expectation-
decreasing process) we have that
EY1  EY0
Furthermore, given that V (0) = 0 (since the ﬁrm ceases to
exist when Xt = 0;8t), and from (4), we have that:
ExY1 = Ex
Z 1
0
e rsdZs = V (x)  ExY0 = V (x)
where x = X0 and V (x) is a guess to the optimal solution.
Since V (x)  V (x) from Lemma 1, this would imply
that the least upper-bound on the set of all guesses is the
optimal solution. Thus, the guess must be minimized, and
this is done using linear programming. But to solve the
problem using linear programming, we must ﬁrst translate
the problem to one with explicit constraints, and then
convert from continuous-time to discrete-time.
3This type of policy is known as a ‘barrier policy’, see [5]. The cash
reserves are bound between two non-reﬂective barriers, since the ﬁrm ceases
to exist if Xt = 0.
Lemma 1 rests on the fact that the process Yt is an
expectation-decreasing process. Re-stated, this means that
each expected increment of Yt should be nonpositive.
EdYt  0 (5)
The conditions under which (5) holds are explicit con-
straints to the linear programming problem. To that end, we
solve for dYt using Itˆ o’s Lemma, to get, for i = 1;:::;n:
EdYt =
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
e rt

(1    VX)dZt + ( r V + 0
i  VX
+1
22
i  VXX)dt

if Xt  
e rt

(1    VX)dZt + ( r V + i  VX
+1
22
i  VXX)dt

if Xt > 
(6)
And since dZt  0 (dividends must always be nonnega-
tive), (6) gives us the conditions under which the process Yt
is a supermartingale (i.e., EdYt  0). Speciﬁcally4:
M  V = (1    VX)  0
L V =
(
 r V + 0
i  VX + 1
22
i  VXX  0 if 0  Xt  
 r V + i  VX + 1
22
i  VXX  0 if Xt > 
 V (0) = 0
Since we use a numerical method, we minimize on a
ﬁnite grid designed to approximate all possible values of
the cash reserves, Xt. Also we have that 0 < Xt < a
(the dividends threshold), i.e., the cash reserves are bound
between two non-reﬂective barriers, and we can restrict
our grid to be between 0 and a + , where  > 0. Since
the dividends threshold is a part of the solution, a certain
amount of trial-and-error is needed to estimate a.
For the discretization process, we discretize the variable
x over some suitable interval x 2 [0;xmax], where x = jh,
with j = 1;2;:::;n0 and h = xmax=n0. The O(h) and
O(h2) accurate approximations to the derivatives are:
V (xj) = V j
V x(xj) =
V j+1   V j 1
2h
=
V j+2   V j
2h
V xx(xj) =
V j+1   2V j + V j 1
h2 =
V j+2   2V j+1 + V j
h2
Here, of course, V x is the ﬁrst derivative, and V xx is the
second derivative, with respect to x. By imposing the linear
constraints at n0 interior points, we get a total of n0(n +
1) + 1 constraints and n0 + 2 unknown variables, V i;i =
1;2;:::;n0. In general terms, the ﬁnite-dimensional problem
is stated as:
mincTv
s. t.
Av  b
v1 = 0
where v is the unknown vector of length n0 + 2, A is a
n0(n + 1) + 1  (n0 + 2) matrix, b is a vector of length
4The last condition is from Lemma 1.
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ci = 1;8i.
All output from the computational method described here,
when compared with models with known solutions resulted
in errors that were in the range of 10 4 or lower, going down
to 10 6.
III. RESULTS
We restrict our analysis to the n = 2 case, i.e., for when
there are two (i;i) pairs. This is for clarity of results and
convenience of execution.
A. Non-Innovative Firms
For non-innovative ﬁrms, the innovation parameter,  = 0,
and the process collapses into arithmetic Brownian motion.
We ﬁnd that when the distress-drifts (0
i;i = 1;2) are
around 20% and 60% of the risk free rate, for i = 1;2,
respectively5, it is optimal for the manager to invest in the
high-risk portfolio under ﬁnancial distress, when x < .
When functioning outside of ﬁnancial distress, x > , the
manager behaves conservatively for low cash reserves, and
progressively undertakes riskier investments as cash reserves
increase, until the dividend threshold, a, is reached.
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Fig. 1: The manager of a non-innovative ﬁrm behaves ag-
gressively below the ﬁnancial distress threshold and behaves
“normally” above it - choosing strategies that increase in risk
with cash reserves. We have that 
0
1 =
1
5r and 
0
2 =
3
5r (r is
the risk-free rate). Thus, for non-innovative ﬁrms, the manager
must be punished aggressively to undertake optimal risk-taking
under ﬁnancial distress.
1) Analytical Solution: We work to get a closed-form
solution to compare with our numerical results, and we ﬁnd
that the results match up nicely with a mean error in the
10 4 range.
The technique to solve for an analytical solution involves
guessing that Li[V ] = 0 when it is optimal to use (i;i)
and L0
i[V ] = 0 when it is optimal to use (0
i;i). Also,
MV (x) = 0 for x > a, the dividends threshold. Speciﬁcally,
5They are around 33% and 83% of their respective non-distress drifts.
 rV + 0
iV X + 1
22
i V XX = 0 for 0  x  ; i < n
 rV + 0
nV X + 1
22
nV XX = 0 for 0  x  ; i = n
 rV + iV X + 1
22
i V XX = 0 for   x  a; i < n
 rV + nV X + 1
22
nV XX = 0 for x  ; i = n  
1   V X

= 0 for a  x
(7)
Solving these second-order, linear ordinary differential
equations (ODEs) gives us the explicit functional form of
the solution as follows:
V (x) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
A0
ie
0
ix + B0
ie
0
ix for 0  x  ; i < n
A0
ne
0
nx + B0
ne
0
nx for 0  x  ; i = n
Aieix + Bieix for 0  x  ; i < n
Anenx + Bnenx for x  ; i = n
x +  for a  x
(8)
where all of the  and  terms are the positive and negative
quadratic roots, respectively, of:
 
1
2
22 +    r = 0 (9)
Equation (9) is the general representation of the
characteristic equation of the second-order, linear ODE,
where  and  can be replaced by adding appropriate
subscripts and/or superscripts. The A and B terms are
constants that are the consequence of solving the second-
order, linear ODEs. These can be determined using
the smooth-ﬁt heuristic, which adds an extra degree of
smoothness to V at the boundaries, thus making it easier to
calculate the analytical solution. The constant  can also be
calculated similarly.
We next calculate the analytical solution for the n = 1
case, which can be determined simply by solving the equa-
tions we get from (8). Using that V (0) = 0, we have that
A0 =  B0. From this, and the smooth-ﬁt heuristic, we can
solve the set of ﬁve simultaneous equations to get our ﬁve
unknowns, which are the constants A0, A1, B1, a, and . In
doing so, we ﬁnd that:
A0 =
d1
c1
e1( a) +
d1
c1
e1( a)
A1 = d1e 1a
B1 = d2e 1a (10)
a =
d3
1   1
 = A1e1a + B1e1a   a
where
c1 = e0   e0
c2 = 0e0   0e0
d1 =
 1
1(1   1)
d2 =
1
1(1   1)
d3 = ln

e1 f(d1=c1)   (1d1=c2)g
e1 f(1d2=c2)   (d2=c1)g

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quadratic equation: 1
222
n + n   r = 0, from the
characteristic equations for the second-order, linear ODEs
in equation (7). Thus, we have our analytical solution for
the case of one policy, i.e., one     pair or when n = 1.
When compared, our numerical solution matches up nicely
with this analytical solution, and has a mean error in the
10 4 range.
This result gives support to our numerical technique, but
with only one investment strategy to choose from, we cannot
show risk-taking under ﬁnancial distress. We thus move on
to when  is nonzero, i.e., innovative ﬁrms.
B. Innovative Firms
For innovative ﬁrms, where 0 <  < 1, we ﬁnd that
distress costs do not have to be as low as they were for
non-innovative ﬁrms for the manager to undertake risky
investments optimally under ﬁnancial distress. Speciﬁcally,
for the n = 2 case, it is optimal to use the risky policy
under ﬁnancial distress as  ! 1, when 0
1 = 1
21 and
0
2 = 2
52. Above the distress threshold, when x > ,
optimal managerial behavior is as seen in [2], with
investment policy riskiness increasing as the cash reserves
increase.
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Fig. 2: The manager of an innovative ﬁrm optimally undertakes
a risky investment to get out of ﬁnancial distress, and  is
as given above up to 6 decimal points. For the same set of
parameters, we see “normal” behavior by the manager both,
above and below the ﬁnancial distress threshold. Note that we
have restricted the state-space up to xmax = 5 for easier
viewing. The actual dividends threshold, a is much larger, and
explodes with increasing .
It is optimal for the manager to undertake risky
investments under ﬁnancial distress as the innovation
parameter increases, i.e., as the ﬁrm gets more innovative.
Speciﬁcally, as  gets closer to, but not equal to, one. Once
 gets large enough, the uniqueness of the ﬁrm’s products
allows the manager to undertake risky investments since
the cash reserve increments (dXt) get larger. Note that for
 = 1, [2] show that the optimal solution V (x) = x when
  r and V (x) = 1 when  > r. It is unlikely that
  r, since drifts should be greater than the risk-free rate,
and V (x) = 1 does not make any sense. Thus, the results
for  = 1 are uninteresting.
To solve analytically for innovative ﬁrms with ﬁnancial
distress costs is difﬁcult. The addition of ﬁnancial distress
costs and increasing the available policies to n = 2, compli-
cates the problem considerably and the same technique used
earlier for arithmetic Brownian motion cannot be used here.
We do not have the problem reduce to second-order, linear
ordinary differential equations to be solved. Thus, this is left
for future research.
IV. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The ﬁnance literature [6, for example] states that it is both
leverage and ﬁnancial distress costs that cause managers
to indulge in suboptimal risk-taking for the ﬁrm. We ﬁnd
that managers can still behave aggressively without leverage
and, furthermore, that it is optimal to ﬁrm value that they
do so.
Through our analysis we have two main ﬁndings. Firstly,
that risk-taking by managers of ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress
is optimal under certain conditions. Secondly, amongst the
many factors that make risk-taking optimal are the presence
of ﬁnancial distress costs as well as the level of innovation
in the ﬁrm.
One principal cause for the current ﬁnancial crisis has to
do with the mis-pricing of credit. If credit is over-priced,
it becomes expensive. It becomes particularly expensive for
a ﬁrm under ﬁnancial distress. Since, for a non-innovative
ﬁrm, this would result in prohibitively high distress costs
(particularly for a ﬁrm heavily dependent on credit), this
would make risk-taking optimal, and would result in
managers exposing the ﬁrm, and the larger economy, to
unnecessary risks. As a result, policymakers should consider
calibrating subsidies and tariffs imposed on innovative
versus non-innovative ﬁrms – particularly those ﬁrms under
ﬁnancial distress – and move towards a more dichotomous
policy.
A logical step for future research would be an empirical
examination of risk-taking by leaders of innovative and non-
innovative ﬁrms under ﬁnancial distress.
APPENDIX A
INNOVATIVE FIRMS WITH n = 2 AND WITHOUT
FINANCIAL DISTRESS
When solving the [3] model using our numerical technique
(not done in closed form by the authors), we ﬁnd a concave
V (x), with the low-risk policy being used, followed by the
high-risk policy, which is used once cash reserves increase
to a given level.
What is interesting is the the optimal switching point - the
point at which it is optimal to switch from Policy 1 to Policy
2 - actually decreases for increases in . Table I, below,
outlines various thresholds for changing values of  for two
sets of parameters. While the policy-switching point (shown
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switching point (a1!2) and the dividends threshold (a),
for three given sets of parameter values.
Set 1a Set 2b
 a1!2 a a1!2 a
0 0.56 1.96 1.16 2.64
0.1 0.52 2.16 1.12 3.08
0.2 0.44 2.48 1.08 4.4
0.3 0.4 3.2 1.04 8.52
0.4 0.32 5.12 0.96 18.92
0.5 0.24 10.28 0.84 19.96
0.6 0.16 19.96 0.68 19.96
0.7 0.08 19.96 0.48 19.96
0.8 0.04 19.96 0.24 19.96
0.9 0.04 19.96 0.04 19.96
a 1 = :15;2 = :3;1 = :3;2 = :5;r = :05
b 1 = :6;2 = :7;1 = :65;2 = :75;r = :05
as a1!2) decreases as  increases, the dividends threshold,
a, increases with 6. This may go to explain the risk-taking
behavior by the manager when under ﬁnancial distress for
higher levels of , which does not exist for lower levels of
.
APPENDIX B
INNOVATIVE FIRMS WITH n = 2 AND FINANCIAL
DISTRESS
Interestingly, in this case we do not see a decrease in the
post-distress optimal switching point (call this a1!2), but
we do see a decrease in the pre-distress optimal switching
point (call this a10!20), as  increases7. Table II, below,
displays the same information as Table I, above. However,
there is an additional parameter here - . We show how the
pre- and post-distress switching points change as both, 
and  change.
We also show a graphical representation of Table II, in
Figures 3a, 3b and 3c. These show the relationship of  and
 versus the pre-distress switching point (a10!20), the post-
distress switching point (a1!2) and the dividends threshold
(a), respectively.
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6For this table, we used xmax = 20, n0 = 500, and h = 0:04. Values
going up to 19.96 (one step-size smaller than xmax) mean that they fall
outside the state-space. This is case with the dividends threshold for Set 1,
and is consistent with the results in [2] where it is proved that for  = 1,
V (x) = 1 for  > r. Similarly the smallest step-size, 0.04, is equivalently
understood to be zero, as is the case with the policy-switching point for Set
3.
7To clarify, the pre-distress switching point is the point at which it is
optimal to switch from one policy to the next, for those policies that are
used under ﬁnancial distress. Speciﬁcally, (0
1;1) and (0
2;2). The post-
distress switching point is the optimal switching point to stop using (1;1)
and start using (2;2).
TABLE II: The relationship between  and  versus the
pre-distress policy-switching point (a10!20); the post-distress
policy-switching point (a1!2); and the dividends threshold
(a) for a given set of parameter values.
 = 0:5  = 1
 a10!20 a1!2 a a10!20 a1!2 a
0 0.3 0.95 2.4 0.3 1.2 2.65
0.1 0.25 0.9 2.65 0.25 1.2 2.95
0.2 0.2 0.9 3.35 0.2 1.25 3.6
0.3 0.2 0.9 19.95 0.2 1.25 5.45
0.4 0.15 0.85 11 0.15 1.25 11
0.5 0.1 0.85 19.95 0.1 1.25 19.95
0.6 0.05 0.8 19.95 0.05 1.25 19.95
0.7 0 0.75 19.95 0 1.25 19.95
0.8 0 0.75 19.95 0 1.25 19.95
0.9 0 0.7 19.95 0 1.25 19.95
1 0 0.65 19.95 0 1.25 19.95
 = 1:5  = 2
 a10!20 a1!2 a a10!20 a1!2 a
0 0.3 1.5 2.95 0.3 2 3.35
0.1 0.25 1.5 3.3 0.25 2 3.7
0.2 0.2 1.6 3.9 0.2 2 4.25
0.3 0.2 1.6 12.6 0.2 2 5.75
0.4 0.15 1.6 11 0.15 2 11
0.5 0.1 1.65 19.95 0.1 2 19.95
0.6 0.05 1.65 19.95 0.05 2.1 19.95
0.7 0 1.7 19.95 0 2.15 19.95
0.8 0 1.75 19.95 0 2.2 19.95
0.9 0 1.8 19.95 0 2.3 19.95
1 0 1.85 19.95 0 2.45 19.95
0
1 = 0:1;0
2 = 0:2;1 = 0:3;2 = 0:5;1 = 0:4;2 = 0:5;
r = 0:05
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Fig. 3: The relationship between  and  versus the pre-distress
switching threshold (a10!20); the post-distress switching point
(a1!2); and the dividends threshold (a).
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